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It has long been argued that the implementation of market-based environmental policy 
instruments such as environmentally-related taxes and tradable permits is likely to lead to 
greater technological innovation than more direct forms of regulation such as technology-
based standards. One of the principle reasons for such an assertion is that they give firms 
greater „flexibility‟  to identify the optimal means of innovating to meet the given 
environmental objective. Thus, it can be argued that the benefits of (some) market-based 
instruments can also be true of well-designed performance standards. While the theoretical 
case for the use of flexible policy instruments is well-developed, empirical evidence remains 
limited. Drawing upon a database of patent applications from a cross-section of countries 
evidence is provided for the positive effect of „flexibility‟  of the domestic environmental 
policy regime on the propensity for the inventions induced to be diffused widely in the world 
economy. For a given level of policy stringency, countries with more flexible environmental 
policies are more likely to generate innovations which are diffused widely and are more likely 
to benefit from innovations generated elsewhere. And while the focus of this paper is on the 
specific case of environmental policy, the discussion is equally applicable to aspects of 
product and labour market regulation which have implications for technological innovation, 
such as product and workplace safety. 
JEL Code: Q55, Q56, Q58, O31, O33, O38. 
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It has long been argued that the implementation of market-based environmental policy instruments 
such as taxes and tradable permits is likely to lead to greater technological innovation than more 
direct forms of regulation such as technology-based standards, since they give firms the „flexibility‟ to 
identify  the  optimal  means  of  innovating  to  meet  the  given  environmental  objective.
2  While the 
theoretical case for the use of market -based instruments is well -developed,




This paper seeks to contribute to the body of evidence which relates to this proposition.  In particular, 
it is argued that the more flexible is an individual country‟s environmental policy regime the more 
likely it is to induce innovations which are able to find markets overseas. The reason for this is 
intuitive.  If  more  „prescriptive‟  policies  such  as  technology-based  standards  are  applied,  the 
technology adoption decision is constrained by the precise characteristics of the standard. And unless 
other countries adopt standards which are equivalent in nature, the innovations induced are unlikely to 
be  acceptable  to  permitting  authorities  overseas.  This  has  the  potential  to  fragment  markets  for 
innovation  along  national  (or  even  sub-national)  lines.  Conversely,  more  „flexible‟  market-based 
instruments are likely to induce innovations which are potentially applicable in a wider variety of 
policy settings. This reduces commercial uncertainty associated with research and development, and 
may allow for the realisation of economies of scale. 
 
                                                       
2 Assuming that the point of incidence of the tax or permit relates directly to the externality to be mitigated. 
3 See Downing and White (1986), Milliman and Prince (1989), Nentjes and Wiersma (1987) and, Jung et al. 
(1996). 
4 Jaffe, Newell and Stavins (2002) and Vollebergh (2007) both provide recent reviews of the empirical literature 
on this theme. 3 
 
Drawing upon a database of patent applications from a cross-section of countries evidence is provided 
for the positive effect of „flexibility‟ of the domestic environmental policy regime on the propensity 
for the inventions induced to be diffused widely in the world economy. A measure of international 
technology transfer is developed for technologies which relate to the mitigation of air and water 
pollution and solid waste management. The results of the empirical analysis confirm the positive role 
of policy flexibility on international technology transfer. 
 
Following this introduction, section 2 provides a discussion of the potential role of regulation in 
fragmenting markets for innovation. Section 3 describes the data used to measure both technology 
transfer and policy flexibility. Section 4 provides a description of the empirical model, as well as the 
results. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of policy implications. 
 
2. Environmental Regulation and Fragmentation of Innovation Markets 
 
While the empirical evidence on the effects of environmental policy on trade in goods and services 
remains limited and ambiguous,
5 there is reason to expect that differences in environ mental policy 
regimes would have an effect on  international trade and foreign direct investment patterns.  While 
some environmentalists have argued that policies should be harmonised in order to avoid such effects, 
this is unlikely to be  welfare -improving. Environmental policies may differ across countries due to 
both supply (i.e. ecological conditions)  and demand conditions (i.e. preferences for environmental 
quality), and these factors should be reflected in domestic policy regimes if it is to bring about welfare 
improvements.  While  there are some arguments for policy harmonisa tion in certain cases (e.g . 
imperfect enforcement, transfrontier pollution), economists are more concerned with the potential for 
domestic environmental policy to be used as a barrier to trade in order to protect domestic industries 
(see Ederington and Minier 2003 for a recent empirical study).
6 
                                                       
5 See Levinson and Taylor (2008) which provides new results and a methodological discussion of the reasons 
why positive evidence in this area remains limited.  
6 See Greaker and Eggert (2008) for a discussion of the GMO case.  4 
 
 
Unfortunately much of the relevant literature in this area has focused on the effects of differences in 
the  stringency  of  environmental  policy,  and  not  on  the  effects  of  differences  in  policy  design. 
However, it is well-known that different policy instruments will affect the incentives for firms to 
develop and adopt environmentally beneficial technologies in different ways. In general, a strong case 
has been made for the use of market-based instruments (e.g. taxes, tradable permits), rather than direct 
regulation (e.g. technology-based controls, performance standards) in order to induce innovation (see 
Jaffe et al. 2002 for a review). In particular, it is argued that the rate of innovation under market-based 
instruments  is  more  likely  to  be  optimal  since  a  greater  proportion  of  benefits  of  technological 
innovation and adoption will be realised by the firm itself than is the case for many direct forms of 
regulation. Moreover, since market-based instruments are not „prescriptive‟, they are more likely than 
many types of direct regulation to ensure that the direction of technological change is cost-minimising 
with respect to the avoidance of damages.
7  
 
However, the stark juxtaposition between market-based instruments and direct forms of regulation is 
somewhat misleading.  Rather it is more helpful to think in terms of vectors of characteristics of 
different instruments, and what effect each of these characteristics has on innovation. Relevant vectors 
would include at least the following: 
 
  Flexibility – i.e. does it let the innovator figure out the best way to meet the objective 
(whatever that objective may be) 
  Targeted – i.e. is the point of incidence of the policy directly on the externality or is it on a 
„proxy‟ for the pollutant 
  Depth – i.e.  are there incentives to innovate throughout the range of potential objectives 
(down to zero emissions) 
                                                       
7 See Jaffe et al. (2002). 5 
 
  Stability  – i.e. does the policy measure provide a signal to pontential inventors which 
contributes to (or reduces) investor uncertainty 
 
There  is  no  precise  mapping  from  instrument  type  to  each  of  these.  For  instance,  different 
environment-related taxes may have very different attributes. A tax on CO2 is flexible, targeted, deep, 
and often predictable. However, a differentiated tax for „environmentally friendly products‟ is not 
flexible, targeted or deep.
8 Indeed it could be argued that such a measure would have more similarity 
with technology-based standards than with a CO2 tax. More generally, a performance standard with a 
similar  point  of  incidence  (i.e.  on  the  pollutant  itself)  and  degree  of  flexibility  may  have  more 
similarities with a tax than with a technology-based standard. 
 
In addition to their effects on the rate of innovation, different policy measures (of equal stringency) 
are likely to generate different types of innovation. As such, if different countries introduce different 
types of policy measure, there is likely to be national specialisation in different types of technological 
innovation  to  meet  similar  environmental  objectives.  This  fragmentation  of  environment-related 
innovation  along  national  lines  can  result  in  increased  costs  in  meeting  given  environmental 
objectives.  While the effects of policy design on the international diffusion of innovations has not 
been  addressed  in  the  literature,  in  other  areas  there  is  evidence  of  the  costs  associated  with 
differentiated regulatory systems for pharmaceutical (Vogel 1998) and food (Thilmany and Barrett 
1999) markets. In the environmental domain, there have been a number of studies on the effect of 
differentiated gasoline content regulations in the United States on gasoline price levels and variability 
(see Morris and Stewart 2007, Chakravorty and Nauges 2005, and Chakravorty et al 2007).   
 
In  addition  to  the  price  effects  of  policy  heterogeneity,  the  potential  innovation  effects  of  this 
regulatory heterogeneity may be considerable. Since investment in R&D is risky, any measures which 
constrain  the  potential  market  for  innovations  generated  are  likely  to  present  a  significant 
                                                       
8 For instance, the application of the “bonus-malus” system on the sales price of motor vehicles in France. 6 
 
disincentive. Moreover, it can be costly to gather the information required in order to determine what 
types of innovations are likely to be permitted under a wide variety of policy regimes. However, no 
empirical evidence on the innovation impacts of policy design is available. Moreover, the specific 
effect of the „flexibility‟ of domestic environmental policy has not been addressed. Since flexible 
environmental policies – whether they be environment-related taxes, tradable permit systems, or even 
non-prescriptive  performance  standards  –  allow  for  the  use  of  a  wide  variety  of  technological 
measures, international market applications are likely to be wider.  It might be imagined that such 
effects could also be realised through the implementation of identical technology-based standards.  
Indeed this is similar to the arguments put forth by Sykes (1995) and others.
9 However, this assumes a 
level of coordination which is unlikely to be realised in practice  for environmental technologies, 
although  Coninck  et  al.  (2008)  provide  some  examples  of  international  technology-oriented 
agreements related to climate change.  
 
Alternatively,  in  circumstances  where  a  dominant  country  regulates  first,  the  policy  may  induce 
innovations which affect the policy decisions of subsequent regulators, encouraging them to adopt 
similar regulations. The example of California motor vehicle emissions controls might represent such 
a  case.
10  While this may result in an unfragmented market, it does so at the cost of imposing 
regulations  of  equal  stringency  across  countries  with  d ifferent  ecological  conditions  and 
heterogeneous demand for environmental quality. There is no reason to expect that the optimal path of 
innovation will be induced. Conversely, the use of flexible instruments allows for broad markets for 
innovation, as well as differentiated levels of stringency. In effect, with flexible instruments the level 
of stringency determines the size of different national markets, without bringing about market 
fragmentation.  
 
                                                       
9 Standardisation is, of course, important in the presence of network externalities (see Shy 2001).  However, this 
is of limited relevance to environmental concerns.  
10 See Vogel (1995).  However, an empirical study by Fredriksson and Milliment (2002) finds limited evidence 
of the „California effect‟ in state-level environmental policymaking.  7 
 
3. Data construction and interpretation 
 
As noted above, in this study patent data is used to construct a proxy measure of technology transfer. 
This is an approach used by Eaton and Kortum (1999). However, their study uses data from all patent 
applications, while the focus of this study is on a particular area – environmental technologies. As 
such it is important to first develop a working definition of environmental technologies which can be 
applied to patent data.  
 
3.1. Patent counts as a measure of environment-related innovation 
Patent data have been used as a measure of technological innovation because they focus on outputs of 
the  inventive  process  (Griliches  1990;  OECD  2008).  This  is  in  contrast  to  many  other  potential 
candidates (e.g. research and development expenditures, number of scientific personnel, etc.) which 
are at best imperfect indicators of the innovative performance of an economy since they focus on 
inputs. Moreover, patent data provide a wealth of information on the nature of the invention and the 
applicant, the data is readily available (if not always in a convenient format), discrete (and thus easily 
subject to statistical analysis). Significantly, there are very few examples of economically significant 
inventions which have not been patented (Dernis and Guellec  2001; OECD 2009). Most importantly 
for this study, they can be disaggregated to specific technological areas. 
 
Drawing upon existing efforts to define „environmental‟ activity in sectoral terms, some previous 
studies have related patent classes to industrial sectors using concordances (e.g., Jaffe and Palmer 
1997). The weaknesses of such approach are twofold. First, if the industry of origin of a patent differs 
from industry of use of the patent, then it is not clear to which industrial sector a patent should be 
attributed in the analysis. This is important when studying specifically „environmental‟ technology 
because  in  this  case  the  demand  (users  of  technology)  and  supply  (inventors  of  technology)  of 
environmental innovation may involve different entities. Often, „environmental‟ innovations originate 
in industries which are not specifically environmental in their focus. For example, technologies aimed 8 
 
at  reducing  wastewater  effluents  from  the  pulp  &  paper  industry  are  often  invented  by  the 
manufacturing  or  chemicals  industry  (see  e.g.,  Popp  et  al.  2007).  On  the  other  hand,  some 
„environmental‟  industries  invent  technologies  which  are  widely  applicable  in  non-environmental 
sectors (e.g., processes for separation of waste; separation of vapours and gases). 
 
More fundamentally, sectoral classifications are, by definition, based on commercial outputs. As such 
there  will  be  a  bias  toward  the  inclusion  of  patent  applications  from  sectors  that  produce 
environmental goods and services. The application-based nature of the patent classification systems 
allows  for  a  richer  characterisation  of  relevant  technologies.  Consequently,  in  this  study  patent 
classifications  are  used,  rather  than  those  of  industrial  or  sectoral  classifications.
11  Specifically, 
relevant patents are identified using the International Patent Classification (IPC) system, developed at 
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).  
 
The IPC classes corresponding to the  selected „environmental‟ technologies  are identified in two 
alternative  ways.  First,  we  search  the  descriptions  of  the  classes  online  to  find  those  which  are 
appropriate  (http://www.wipo.int/classifications/ipc/ipc8/?lang=en).  Second,  using  the  online 
international patent database maintained by the European Patent Office (www.espacenet.com), we 
search patent titles and abstracts for relevant keywords. The IPC classes corresponding to the patents 
that come up are included, provided their description confirms their relevancy.  
 
When building the datasets, two possible types of error may arise: irrelevant patents may be included 
or relevant ones left out. The first error happens if an IPC class includes patents that do not bear the 
desired „environmental‟ focus. In order to avoid this problem, we carefully examine a sample of 
patent abstracts for every IPC class considered for inclusion, and exclude those classes that do not 
                                                       
11 While Jaffe and Palmer (1997) used patent totals (environmental and non-environmental patents) to study the 
effect of environmental regulation on innovation, Lanjouw and Mody (1996) and Brunnermeier and Cohen 
(2003) focus on environmental patents only, and their approach is thus similar to ours. However, details on the 
selection of IPC classes they used are not always provided. 9 
 
consist only of patents related to „environment‟. The second error – relevant inventions are left out – 
is less problematic. We can reasonably assume that all innovation in a given field behaves in a similar 
way and hence our datasets can be seen at worst as good proxies of innovative activity in the field 
considered.  However,  overall  innovative  activity  may  be  underestimated  and  totals  may  be  less 
reliable than trends. The description of the IPC codes used to build the datasets for this study can be 
found in Table A1 in the Appendix.  
 
Patent  data  were  extracted  from  the  EPO  World  Patent  Statistical  Database  (EPO  2008),  or 
PATSTAT, using a search algorithm based on a selection of IPC classes (Table A1 in the Appendix 
gives the list of classes included).
12 The patent data are used to construct counts of patent applications 
in selected areas of environmental technology (air pollution, water pollution,  solid waste), classified 
by inventor country (country of residence of the inventor) and priority date (the earliest application 
date within a given patent family). A  panel of patent counts for a cross -section of all countries and 
over a time period of 1975-2006 was obtained. Figure 1 shows the total number of claimed priorities 
in the three  environmental domains. It shows that  air pollution  control  innovations have bee n 
increasing rapidly.  Innovations related to  solid  waste  disposal reached a peak in  1993  and have 
declined since. In the case of water pollution control technologies the peak is in the late 1990s. 
 
                                                       
12 The selection of classifications benefited from searches developed by Lanjouw and Mody (1996) and 
Schmoch (2003). Assistance of Julie Poirier and Marion Hemar (ENSAE, Paris) in developing the search 
strategy is equally acknowledged. 10 
 
 
Figure 1. Number of Patent Applications (Claimed Priorities, Worldwide) for ‘Environmental’ 
Technologies by Environmental Medium 
 
Figure 2 gives patent counts in environmental technology for selected countries which have exhibited 
significant levels of innovation. Germany, Japan and the US have the highest number of claimed 
priorities.  While  Germany,  Japan,  the  US,  France  and  the  UK  are  consistently  important  in 
environmental technologies examined, other significant innovators in specific areas have included 
Sweden (air), Canada and the Netherlands (water), Italy (waste), and since the late-1990s also Korea 

















































































Air Pollution Water Pollution Solid Waste Total Patents (right-axis)11 
 
 
Figure 2. Number of Patent Applications (Claimed Priorities, Worldwide, 3-year moving 
average) for ‘Environmental’ Technologies for Selected Countries 
 
3.2 Duplicate Patent Filings as a Measure of Technology Transfer 
Technology transfer can be either embodied or disembodied, and take place through the market or by 
non-market  means.  A  possible  taxonomy  might  take  the  following  form  (see  Maskus  2004  and 
Hoekman and Javorcik 2006): 
 
  Market 
o  Trade in goods and services 
o  Foreign direct investment 
o  Licensing 
o  Joint ventures 
o  Cross-border movement of personnel  
 
  Non-market 
o  Imitation and reverse engineering 
o  Employee turnover 


































The empirical evidence strongly supports the finding that the bulk of technology transfer takes place 
via trade, foreign direct investment and licensing (Maskus 2004). Precisely which channel is most 
important depends in part upon the characteristics of the „recipient country‟ (i.e. domestic research 
capacity, strength of intellectual property rights regimes, etc.) and nature of the technology being 
„transferred‟ (i.e. potential for imitation and reverse engineering). The use of patent data to measure 
international technology transfer arises from the fact that there will be a partial „trace‟ of all three of 
these channels of transfer in patent applications. If there is any potential for reverse engineering then 
exporters, investors and licensors have an incentive to protect their intellectual property when it goes 
overseas. 
 
The potential to use patent data as the base from which to develop a proxy measure of technology 
transfer arises from the fact that protection for a single invention may be sought in a number of 
countries. While the vast majority of inventions are only patented in one country (often that of the 
inventor,  particularly  for  large  countries),  some  are  patented  in  multiple  countries  (i.e.  the 
„international patent family size‟ is greater than one). Such „duplicate‟ applications can then be used 
to develop indicators of technology transfer.  
 
Of course patent only gives the applicant protection from potential imitators. It does not reflect actual 
transfer  of  technologies.  If  applying  for  protection  did  not  cost  anything,  inventors  might  patent 
widely and indiscriminately. However, patenting is costly – both in terms of the costs of preparation 
of the application and in terms of  the administrative costs and fees associated with the approval 
procedure (see Helfgott 1993 for some comparative data; Berger (2005) and Van Pottelsberghe and 
Francois (2006) also provide more recent data for European Patent Office applications). Moreover, if 
enforcement is weak, the publication of the patent in a local language can increase vulnerability to 
imitation (see Eaton and Kortum 1996 and 1999). As such, inventors are unlikely to apply for patent 13 
 
protection  in  a  second  country  unless  they  are  relatively  certain  of  the  potential  market  for  the 
technology that the patent covers.  
 
Unfortunately  the  IPC  classifications  used  in  the  extraction  of  patent  data  do  not  have  precise 
concordance with trade data classifications. However, the reliability of the use of duplicate patent 
applications as a measure of technology transfer can be seen through a comparison of one particular 
type of „environmental‟ technology in which trade and patent classifications are similar – wind power.  
Using data from the UN COMTRADE database (http://comtrade.un.org/db/) it is possible to compare 
exports of “wind-powered electric generating equipment” (HS 850231) with the count of duplicate 
patent applications by priority office for “wind motors” (IPC F03D). Figure 3 provides data for the 
main  inventing  countries  for  the  period  1996-2003,  the  only  years  for  which  the  trade  data  is 
available.   
 
 







































































While the correlation is not perfect, it is positive and significant. Indeed the top four exporters are also 
the top four priority offices, and the Spearman rank correlation coefficient for the top 30 countries by 
trade  is  0.68.  Moreover,  some  of  the  discrepancies  may  be  attributable  to  shortcomings  in 
COMTRADE‟s coverage. For instance, for reasons of commercial confidentiality, trade figures for 
low-level HS classifications may be significantly downward biased. This would explain the number of 




We have extracted all relevant patent applications filed from 1975 to 2006. It is common to present 
patent data in terms of inventor countrie s (as in Section 3.1 above) in order to measure national 
inventive activity. However, in this case the data used to contruct the dependent variable is expressed 
in terms of „priority offices‟, since we are concerned with the effect of policy design in different 
jurisdictions. Applying the definition of environmental technologies developed in Section 3.1, Figure 
1 shows the bilateral relations that have included the largest volume of transfer internationally. 
Table  1,  in  turn,  lists  the  bilateral  transfer  relations  that  include  the  highest  percentage  of 
„environmental‟ innovations.  
 
 
   
                                                       
13 See http://comtrade.un.org/kb/attachments/1.%20UN%20Comtrade%20Coverage%20and%20Limitations-
GUIDbecc0aa5044f44b5a048a8b45bce6d19.pdf  15 
 
Figure 1. International Transfer of Selected ‘Environmental’ Technologies (1990-2005) 
a. Air pollution abatement 
 
b. Water pollution abatement 
 




Table 1. The most AWW-intensive bilateral transfer relations  
(Number of duplicate patent filings in AWW-relevant fields as a share of overall transfer, 2001-2003) 




Transfer  Share 
JP  PL  36  191  18.85% 
NL  BE  7  61  11.48% 
CZ  SK  8  76  10.53% 
AT  MX  8  90  8.89% 
CN  HK  10  122  8.20% 
AT  PL  9  114  7.89% 
NO  MX  5  64  7.81% 
FI  MX  11  142  7.75% 
PL  AU  15  212  7.08% 
CZ  AU  6  85  7.06% 
RU  UA  8  115  6.96% 
FI  NO  18  259  6.95% 
JP  ZA  17  246  6.91% 
FI  PL  9  132  6.82% 
KR  SG  4  60  6.67% 
GR  AU  6  92  6.52% 
CA  NZ  4  62  6.45% 
UA  RU  19  299  6.35% 
GB  IE  6  97  6.19% 
AU  NZ  46  761  6.04% 
CA  KR  5  83  6.02% 
AT  BR  11  183  6.01% 
Note: „Environmental‟ technologies covered include: Air + Water + Waste, or AWW. Only 
bilateral relations with total transfers greater than 50 applications were included. 
 
 
3.3 Flexiblity of Environmental Policy 
Given the heterogeneity of environmental policy regimes both across countries, and within countries 
across sectors and impacts (as well as through time), it is difficult to construct a general index of the 
„flexibility‟ of environmental policy regimes. However, in the period 2001-2003, the World Economic 
Forum‟s  “Executive  Opinion  Survey”  asked  respondents  a  number  of  questions  related  to 
environmental policy design.  The survey is implemented by the WEF‟s partner institutes in over 100 
countries, which include Departments of Economics in leading universities and research departments 
of business associations. The means of survey implementation varies by country and includes postal, 
telephone, internet and face-to-face survey. In most years there are responses from between 8,000 and 
10,000 firms (see Sala-i-Martin 2008 for a description of the sampling strategy). 17 
 
 
Specifically, respondents (usually CEOs) were requested to indicate the extent to which they had the 
freedom to choose different options in order to achieve compliance with environmental regulations. 
Respondents were requested to assess the degree of flexibility on a Likert scale, with 1 = offer no 
options for achieving compliance, 7 = are flexible and offer many options for achieving compliance. 
Mean responses for some of the countries included in our sample are provided in Figure 4.  
 
 
Figure 4. Index of Flexibility of Environmental Policy Regimes for Selected Countries (mean 
value over 2001-2003) 
 
3.4. Other explanatory variables 
For a given level of flexibility, the stringency of environmental policy will determine the size of 
markets for innovation. As such, it may be necessary to control for differences in the stringency of 
environmental  policy  across  countries  and  over  time.  For  this  purpose,  an  index  of  perceived 


























































































stringency  has  been  assessed  on  a  Likert  scale,  with  1  =  lax  compared  with  that  of  most  other 
countries, 7 = among the world‟s most stringent. Mean responses for some of the countries included 
in our sample are provided in Figure 5.  
 
 
Figure 5. Index of Stringency of Environmental Policy Regimes for Selected Countries (mean 
value over 2001-2006) 
 
As found in more general studies of technology transfer, domestic absorptive capacity is an important 
factor. While the number of scientific personnel or expenditures on R&D in the relevant fields could 
be used as measures of domestic scientific capacity, in practice the lack of data for many non-OECD 
countries (even  at  the  macroeconomic  level) prohibits  the  use  of  such  a  measure.  Therefore,  we 
assume that patent data can also be used to measure absorptive capacity of the recipient country. A 















































































Technologies may only be transferred if they have been developed in the first place. To capture the 
stock of inventions in source country that are potentially available for transfer elsewhere, a variable is 
constructed that reflects the number of patent applications by domestic inventors filed in the current or 
the three previous years. This time span is appropriate given the limitations on international patenting 
imposed  by  international  patent  treaties.
14  Thus, the mode of the distribution of transfer lags is 
between 1 and 2 years, as expected. It must also be noted that, as in the previous case, the entire stock 
of inventions in PATSTAT is considered when constructing the variable, including inventions for 
which no claims for protection have been sought in countries other than that of the priority office. The 
sign of this variable is expected to be positive. 
 
Finally, differences in the general propensity to transfer patents between countries and over time are 
captured through the use of a variable which reflects overall duplicate patent applications filed across 
the whole spectrum of technologica l areas. This variable should capture all of the more general 
economic factors which are likely to influence transfer (e.g. common language, geographic distance, 
commercial relations, strength of intellectual property rights, etc .), but which are not speci fic to 
„environmental‟ innovation. The sign is expected to be positive.  
 
4. Empirical Model and Results 
 
Our aim is to analyse the relationship between the nature of policy regimes and technology transfer. 
To do so, we construct a gravity model which allows us to examine all potential bilateral relations 
between  source  and  recipient  countries.  The  hypothesis  is  that,  other  things  being  equal,  more 
„flexible‟  environmental  policy  regimes  are  likely  to  generate  innovations  with  broad  potential 
acceptance in overseas markets. Figure 5 provides a scatter plot of the relationship between the index 
                                                       
14 Lags associated with filing duplicate applications are, in part, determined by the Paris Convention (1883), 
stipulating that applications abroad must be filed within one year of the date when the initial application was 
filed (referred to as „priority date‟). If the inventor does file abroad within one year, the inventor will have 
priority over any similar patent applications received in those countries since the priority date. In addition, under 
the Patent Cooperation Treaty (1970) the applicant may file an international application which allows further 18 
months to make any duplicate filings in signatory countries. 20 
 
of the flexibility of environmental policy regimes and the log of „exports‟ (outflows) of environmental 
technologies, suggesting a positive relationship, with the correlation coefficient = 0.45 (at <0.001% 
significance level).  
 
 
Figure 5. Relationship Between the Flexibility of the Environmental Policy Regimes and 
‘Exports’ (Outflows) of Environmental Technologies 
 
Moreover, countries with more flexible policy regimes are more likely to be able to benefit from 
inventions developed elsewhere. As such, Figure 6 gives the same information but from the viewpoint 
of the recipient country. The relationship between the flexibility index and „imports‟ (inflows) of 





Figure 6. Relationship Between the Flexibility of the Environmental Policy Regimes and 
‘Imports’ (Inflows) of Environmental Technologies 
 
Based on the discussion above, the following equation is specified:  
      AWWTTijt = β1 + β2FLEXit  + β3FLEXjt + β4STRNGit + β5STRNGjt    
           + β6AWWSTOCKit  + β7AWWPAT jt +  β
8TOTALTT ijt + ϵijt  
where i represents the source country, j the recipient country
15, and t = 1998,…,2006 indexes time
16. 
Our dependent variable is a measure of the number of patents in source country i (the „priority‟ office) 
for which protection has also been sought in recipient country j (the „duplicate‟ office) in year t. On 
the right-hand side of the equation, FLEXit and FLEXjt reflect the degree of flexibility of the source 
and recipient country‟s environmental policy regimes, respectively. It is expected that the sign of 
these variables is positive. Similarly, STRNGit and STRNGjt reflect the degree of stringency of the 
source and recipient countries‟ environmental policy regimes. AWWSTOCKit is the available stock of 
                                                       
15 There are 101 source and recipient countries in the sample. 
16 That is, 3 years after and 3 years prior to the availability of data on the flexibility index.  22 
 
inventions in environment-related technologies measured as the sum of patent applications invented in 
the source country during the current and the previous three years. The sign is expected to be positive. 
AWWPATjt is the total number of patent applications for environment-related technologies invented 
in the recipient country and the expected sign is positive, since increased absorptive capacity should 
increase transfers. And finally, TOTALTTijt  is the total number of patents which are transferred from 
source country to recipient country, and sign is expected to be positive. All the residual variation is 
captured by the error term (εijt). Table 2 gives the basic descriptive statistics for the sample used. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the panel dataset 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
AWWTTijt  21822  0.57  8.27  0  498 
FLEXit  21822  3.94  0.62  1.7  5.4 
FLEXjt  21822  3.94  0.62  1.7  5.4 
STRNGit  21822  4.12  1.31  1.2  6.7 
STRNGjt  21822  4.12  1.31  1.2  6.7 
AWWSTOCKit  21822  421.25  1273.64  0  7790 
AWWPATjt  21822  109.32  329.02  0  2024 
TOTALTTijt  21822  42.74  768.19  0  49584 
                 
  
Given the count nature of the dependent variable, the equation is estimated as a negative binomial 
model using maximum likelihood.
17 Four alternative model specifications are estimated. This includes 
models where the flexibility index varies over time, pl acing a constraint on the length of the panel 
(models 1 & 2). Alternatively, the mean value of the index is used instead allowing for longer panel 
(models 3 & 4). The empirical results (Table 3) confirm all of our principal hypotheses. Starting with 
the control variables, the results suggest that the stock of inventions that are potentially available for 
transfer in the source country, as well as the absorptive capacity of the recipient country, are  both 
important determinants of transfer s  of  „environmental‟  technologies.  Moreover,  such  transfer  is 
positively (and significantly) correlated with the volume of technology transfer overall. These results 
hold for all the alternative models estimated. 
                                                       
17 For further details on negative binomial models, see Cameron and Trivedi (1998); Hausman, Hall and 
Griliches (1984). 23 
 
 
When  it  comes  to  characterization  of  the  differences  in  policy  regimes  between  the  source  and 
recipient countries, the results suggest that countries with more flexible policy measures are both, 
more  likely  to  be  able  to  „export‟  their  inventions  to  markets  abroad,  as  well  as  benefit  from 
inventions already developed elsewhere. The estimated coefficients are positive and highly significant 
in all models estimated.
18 Moreover, controlling for differences in policy stringency (or not) does not 
affect the qualitative nature of this finding.  
 
Table 3. Empirical estimates of the negative binomial model 
Dependent variable: AWWTTijt 
using FLEXjt  using FLEXj_avg 
t=2001-03  t=1998-06  t=2001-06 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Policy Flexibility (FLEXit or FLEXi_avg)  1.3657***  0.2204  2.1638***  0.5966*** 
  (0.000)  (0.102)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Policy Flexibility (FLEXjt or FLEXj_avg)  1.0634***  0.6256***  1.4522***  1.1998*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Policy Stringency (STRNGit) 
 
0.8262***    0.6698*** 
 
 
(0.000)    (0.000) 
Policy Stringency (STRNGjt) 
 
0.3354***    0.1202* 
 
 
(0.000)    (0.047) 
 
 
   
  Available Stock of Inventions (AWWSTOCKit)  0.0004***  0.0003***  0.0003***  0.0003*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Absorptive Capacity (AWWPATjt)  0.0012***  0.0012***  0.0011***  0.0011*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Total Technology Transfer (TOTALTTijt)  0.0042***  0.0026***  0.0044***  0.0028*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Intercept  -13.2789***  -12.1151***  -18.6560***  -14.7467*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
 
 
   
  N  21822  21822  90900  37200 
Log pseudolikelihood  -5757.94  -5548.51  -15888.29  -8035.44 
(Prob > Chi2)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
P-values in parentheses, based on robust standard errors. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
                 
  
                                                       
18 The only exception is model (2), where the significance level is 10.2%. However, the principal results are 
confirmed when year fixed effects are included (Table 4). 24 
 
We note that the findings are robust to the inclusion of year fixed effects (Table 4). Convergence 
problems prevented us from including year fixed effects for the two models with the full sample, as 
well as country fixed effects. However, country-specific heterogeneity is already controlled for by a 
number of regressors in the model that vary across individual country. 
  
Table 4. Empirical estimates of the negative binomial model, with year fixed effects 
Dependent variable: AWWTTijt 
using FLEXjt 
t=2001-03 
(1)  (2) 
Policy Flexibility (FLEXit or FLEXi_avg)  1.5741***  0.4906*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Policy Flexibility (FLEXjt or FLEXj_avg)  1.2925***  0.9103*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 















Available Stock of Inventions (AWWSTOCKit)  0.0004***  0.0003*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Absorptive Capacity (AWWPATjt)  0.0012***  0.0012*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Total Technology Transfer (TOTALTTijt)  0.0034***  0.0024*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Intercept  -14.4582***  -13.1599*** 




N  21822  21822 
Log pseudolikelihood  -5644.45  -5494.47 
(Prob > Chi2)  0.000  0.000 
  P-values in parentheses, based on robust standard errors. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
   25 
 
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
In this paper it has been argued that „differentiated‟ and „prescriptive‟ technology-based regulations 
can result in fragmented technology markets, with the potential market for the innovations induced 
fragmented across different policy jurisdictions. International policy coordination would reduce the 
potential for such fragmentation. For global public goods (such as mitigation of climate change) such 
coordination is evident. The European Union‟s Emissions Trading Scheme is the most significant 
example. However, even for greenhouse gas emissions within Europe, this is the exception and not 
the rule. For many sources there a myriad of differentiated and prescriptive policy measures.  
 
The problem is, of course, more important in the case of local and regional pollutans. Indeed, the 
imposition of uniform standards across countries with different ecological and economic conditions 
would not likely be welfare-improving. However, this does not mean that the benefits associated with 
globalised markets for innovation can not be realised. In effect, it is „flexiblity‟ of policy regimes 
(rather  than  relative  stringency)  which  ensures  that  markets  are  not  fragmented.  Given  the  risks 
associated with expenditures on research and development, and the economies of scale required to 
recover such expenditures, it is important that regulatory regimes not constrain the potential markets 
for any innovations induced.  
 
This flexibility is primarily a consequence of the point of incidence of different policy measures. Any 
policy  which  focuses  on  the  environmental  „bad‟,  rather  than  mandating  a  particular  means  of 
reducing its impact, will provide potential innovators with the flexibility to identify the optimal means 
of its mitigation. This can include performance standards as well as market-based instruments such as 
environmentally related taxes and tradable permits. The key is that the policy measure be „technology-
neutral‟  in  the  sense  that  innovators  have  the  choice  of  technology  to  use  to  meet  a  given 
environmental objective (e.g. SO2 emission levels, wastewater effluent quality). 26 
 
Drawing upon a rich database of patent applications, results on the effects of environmental policy 
design on the international transfer of environmental technologies have been presented. There appears 
to  be  a  strong  relationship  between  CEO‟s  perception  of  the  flexibility  of  environmental  policy 
regimes in different countries and the spatial scope of diffusion of inventions which are first patented 
in these countries.  These results  provide further  support  for the  the  use of  „flexible‟  instruments 
(including market-based instruments) in environmental policy. And while the focus of this paper is on 
the specific case of environmental policy, the discussion is equally applicable to aspects of product 
and labour market regulation which have implications for technological innovation, such as product 
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